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The contrast
Hacquard (2006):
Pouvoir in the present perfect (apres pmoduperfect):
I Epistemic interpretation
(1) Il
He
a
has
pu
canperfect
prendre
take
le
the
train
train
He might have taken the train
The contrast
I Implicative interpretation
(2) Il
He
a
has
pu
canperfect
prendre
take
le
the
train
train
He could the train
Actuality entailment: he took the train
Hacquard (2006,2009,2010)
The merit of Hacquard (2006,2009,2010) is to present a theory of
the systematic ambiguity of the modal that, in her work, is solved
as syntactic scope ambiguity.
Available works that do not address the question of the polysemy:
Mari and Martin (2007); Demirdache, H. et Uribe-Etxebarria, M.
(2008); Laca (2008); Mari and Schweitzer (2010); Homer
(2010a,b); Mari (2011); Pin˜o´n, C. (2011).
Implicative interpretation
PAST > MOD.
T
past Asp
∃e1 ∈ w∗
MOD1
∃w ′
VP
e1
PAST determines the time of the modal evaluation. Event variable closed
at PAST, i.e. outside the modal. ae arises.
Epistemic interpretation
MOD > PAST.
MOD2
∃w2 T
past Asp
∃e1 in w2
VP
e1
PAST determines the time of the eventuality and not the time of the
conjecture.
Major advantage
Hacquard, 2006: 26, ex. 20
(3) Jean a tre`s bien pu prendre le train
Based on what I know (now), he might have taken the train
(in the past)
Present evidence is used; if the modal is evaluated in the past,
mismatch; hence the time of the modal evaluation is the speech
time (hence movement).
No movement: questions, questions, questions, ...
Without movement: modal is interpreted in the past, but epistemic
alternatives are projected at the utterance time.
The modal evaluated in the past is not epistemic (i.e. #given the
evidence I had then ...)
↪→ Question: How open past alternatives and present uncertainty
relate to each other ?
Anticipating ... on the spirit of the solution
→ Mari and Schweitzer (2010): rely on inferential mechanisms
(reasoning forward from past alternatives to epistemic uncertainty).
♦p in the past allow to infer that both p or ¬p are available alternatives in the
present. Since the speaker is in a state of epistemic uncertainty in the present,
both p and ¬p are considered viable alternatives.
The question: how are past metaphysical alternatives
reconstructed given present uncertainty ? Reasoning backward
Major problem for the whole enterprise of Hacquard
(2006,2009): the third interpretation
I Empirical: Mari and Martin (2007) first identify a root (that
they call abilitative), non-implicative reading.
(4) Ce robot a pu repasser les chemises a` un stade bien
pre´cis de son de´veloppement, mais cette fonction n’a
jamais e´te´ utilise´e.
The robot could have ironed skirts at a precise stage of
its development, but this function has never been used.
Goal (I): explain the three-fold ambiguity
A unified theory for the three-fold ambiguity :
(5) a. Root, Implicative. Jean a pu de´placer la table,
#mais il ne l’a pas fait.
John could move the table, #but he did not do it.
b. Epistemic. John a pu prendre le train (comme il a pu
ne pas le prendre)
John might have taken the train (but he might not
have taken it)
c. Root, non-implicative. Ce robot a pu repasser les
chemises a` un stade bien pre´cis de son de´veloppement,
mais cette fonction n’a jamais e´te´ utilise´e.
The robot could have ironed skirts at a precise stage of
its development, but this function has never been used.
Goal (II): competition with past conditional
Speakers reports judgements that highlight a competition between
the non-implicative reading of a pu-sentences and aurait pu-
sentences (modal in the past conditional):
(6) Ce robot aurait pu repasser les chemises a` un stade bien
pre´cis de son de´veloppement, mais cette fonction n’a jamais
e´te´ utilise´e.
This robot could have ironed skirts at a precise stage of its
development, but this function has never been used.
↪→ Why?
Goal (III): explain discursive properties
(7) Qu’est-ce qu’il a fait Jean dans ce bureau ?
Il a de´place´ un meuble
# Il a pu de´placer une table
What did John do in this office ?
He moved a table
#He could move a table
Goal (III): explain discursive properties (continued)
Same property observed for other operators (verum operator,
Gutzman and Castrovejo-Miro, Mari for the French future 2013)
(8) Qu’est-ce qu’il a fait Jean dans ce bureau ?
#Il a de´place´ un meuble
Il a de´place´ une table
What did John do in this office ?
#He moved a table
He moved a table
Gutzman and Castrovejo-Miro solution: assert p and downdate ?p.
Overview
New semantic / pragmatic theory:
I The meaning:
I There is an underspecified semantic rule of interpretation of a
pu-sentences, in which all the operators are interpreted in situ.
I The present perfect is analyzed as a combination of present +
perfect, hence as providing a result state (see Schaden, 2009).
I The interpretations:
I The present perfect has an abductive-inferential use that
exploit knowledge of the result state.
I The variety of interpretations depends on what the speaker
knows, compatibly with the semantics.
Model-theoretic side: branching time framework (Thomason,
1984; Condoravdi, 2002; Mari, 2013).
Composition
TP
λqλpλw∃t[t = now∧
∃t′[t′ ≺ t ∧ q(w, t)
∧Result(q, p)
∃w′[w′ ∈ Acc(w) ∧ p(w′, t′)]]]
Pres
λpλw∃t[t = now ∧ p(t,w)]
PerfP
λqλpλwλt∃t′[t′ ≺ t ∧ q(w, t)
∧Result(q, p)
∃w′[w′ ∈ Acc(w) ∧ p(w′, t′)]]
Perf
λqλpλwλt∃t′[t′ ≺ t ∧ q(w, t)
∧Result(q, p) ∧ p(w, t′)]
ModP
λpλwλt∃w′[w′ ∈ Acc(w)∧
p(w′, t)]
Mod
λpλwλt∃w′[w′ ∈ Acc(w)∧
p(w′, t)]
VP
λpλwλt(p(w, t))
Composition
VP: provides a proposition; its truth is relativized to worlds and
times.
ModP: provides a possible world in which p is true.
Perfect:
- Perfect treated as operator over properties of events (e.g. de
Swart, 2007; Schaden, 2009). It locates the event at a past time
w.r.t. a reference time (which can be present, past or future) and
provides a result event.
- Here, we treat it as a propositional operator.
Perf : provides a past time at which p is true (in possible world w ′)
and provides a result proposition, which is true at a time t in world
w .
Pres provides the now. Proposition q (the result proposition) is
true at now in world w .
↪→ p is true in a possible world w ′ (accessible from w) at a past
time t ′ (for short ♦p(t ′)); the result proposition q is true at now in
world w .
The q world
’Result’ event-related notion, we use it here improperly for
propositions.
(9) Let t ′, t ∈ T , t ′ ≺ t:
Result(p, q) = 1 iff ∀w ′ ∈W (p(w ′, t ′)→ q(w ′, t))
• If q is the result of p, then all worlds in which p is true are
worlds in which q is true.
• p is evaluated at a time that precedes the time of evaluation of q.
Decidedness
The key notion is (non)-decidedness defined in a branching time
framework, Mari, 2013.
and the relations between epistemic and metaphysical
(un-)decidedness, evaluated at different times.
Branching time: basics
We employ a W × T forward-branching structure (Thomason,
1984). A three-place relation ' on T ×W ×W is defined such
that (i) for all t ∈ T , 't is an equivalence relation; (ii) for any
w ,w ′ ∈W and t, t ′ ∈ T , if w ′ 't′ w and t precedes t ′, then
w ′ 't w (we use the symbols ≺ and  for temporal precedence
and succession, respectively).
In words: w ′ 't′ w : w and w ′ are historical alternatives (i.e. are
identical) at least up to t ′ and thus differ only, if at all, in what is
future to t ′.
Branching time: basics
Assume two worlds w ′ and w in W and two times t ′, t ′′ in T such
that t ′ ≺ t ′′. In both partial models in Figure 1, w ′ and w are
equal up to and including t ′ (Thomason, 1984). Worlds that stand
in the equivalence relation 't′ need not branch at t ′; they can
branch at a time after t ′ (e.g., t ′′ in Figure 1b).
w(a)
w ′
t ′
w(b)
w ′
t ′ t ′′
Figure: w 't′ w ′
Branching time: common ground
For any time t ∈ T , we define the common ground cg(t) as the
set of worlds that are identical to the actual world w0 at least up
to and including t.
(10) cg(t) := {w | w 't w0}
w0
t
w1
w2
w3
w4
Figure: cg(t)
Branching time: reasonable futures
(11) ReasFut(t) :=
{wi ∈ cg(t) | wi is such that the set of rules fixed at t
continue to hold in wi}
(12) ReasFut(t) = {w1,w2,w0,w4}
w0
t
w1
w2
w3
w4
Figure: Reasonable Future Worlds (ReasFut)
Branching time: (un)decidedness
I The actual world exists only until the utterance time.
I The actual world is metaphysically decided until and including
the utterance time.
Condoravdi, 2002; Mari, 2013:
I Epistemic interpretation: is compatible with metaphysical
decidedness (options can be metaphysically closed but
epistemically open).
I Metaphysical interpretation: is available with metaphysical
un-decidedness.
→ Given a branching point t, the actual-world-to-be at t is
metaphysically undecided at t.
Representing the semantics in the reasonable-future
branching framework
at t ′, p
w
t ′
w1
|
w0, tu
at tu, q
Figure: Semantics
- ♦q is true at tu : w0 decided at tu. ♦q(tu) : epistemic
alternatives (q, ¬q).
- Since ♦p is true at t ′ which is a branching point, ♦p(t ′) has a
metaphysical interpretation. p and ¬p are metaphysical
alternatives.
The inferential use of the present perfect
Present perfect across languages has an inferential use. (see
among many others: Comrie, 1976; Apotheloz and Nowakowska,
2010 for French and Polish, DeLancey, 2001 for Bulgarian).
Various typologies for the ‘inferential use’: illative, abductive,
explicative, based on direct/direct evidence ....
Apotheloz and Nowakowska (2010) identify an
inferential-abductive use of the present perfect: (free translation,
A&N, ibid.:4): from a present result state one can infer a past
event that has produced this state.
↪→ We exploit here the inferential-abductive use of the present
perfect. I will use the term inferential for short.
The inferential use of pouvoir in the present perfect
• Result state ♦q(tu)
• Knowledge supporting ♦q(tu)
• But also ... Knowledge compatible with ♦q(tu):
I ♦q(tu) ∧ q(tu)
I ♦q(tu) ∧ ¬q(tu)
Epistemic in picture
Semantics:
at t ′, p
w
t ′
w1
|
w0, tu
at tu, q
Pragmatics: at tu knowledge compatible with ♦q(tu); infer
♦p(t ′).
- ♦q is true at tu : w0 decided at tu. ♦q(tu) : epistemic
alternatives.
- Since ♦p is true at t ′ which is a branching point, ♦p(t ′) has a
metaphysical interpretation.
Epistemic: example
(13) Le voleur a tre`s bien pu rentrer par la feneˆtre
The thief might have entered through the window
• My parents never close the windows; knowledge compatible with the
thief having passed (result state) through the window (♦q(tu))):
- Present settledness (the thief passed through the window or did not
pass through the window).
- Both plausible, given what I know.
- The thief passing through the window or not passing through the
window were available continuations of the actual world at the branching
point.
• Backward (i.e. abductive) Inference: it was undecided at the branching
point whether the actual-world-to-be was such that the thief would pass
through the window or not.
- Given what I know, there were metaphysical alternatives such that p
and ¬p were both possible continuations of w0 at t ′, the branching point.
Implicative in picture
Semantics: as above.
Pragmatics:
at t ′, p in w0
at t ′, ¬p in w1
w
t ′
w1
|
w0, tu
at tu, ♦q ; the speaker knows q(tu)
Know at tu: q(tu); infer p(t
′) is true in w0. Implies that ¬p(t ′) is
true in w ′. Counterfactual interpretation: knows that p but knows
that the actual world could have evolved in a way such that ¬p.
Implicative reading: deriving the ae
(14) Il a pu prendre le train
He managed to take the train
• Know : q(tu); Infer p(t ′).
• Ex. John is on the train q(tu); Abductive inference: p(t ′): he
took the train. No actuality entailment.
• Knowledge that q and hence that p, in the context of utterance.
BUT:
• Asserts: ♦p(t ′) (is the speaker being informative ?): since he
knows q(tu) he knows p(t
′). Why does he choose to use the
modal ?
• ¬p(t ′) true in a possible continuation of the actual world at t ′.
↪→ Counterfactual use. He took the train, but the actual world
could have evolved in a way such that ¬p.
↪→ And also .... Abilitative flavor (see Belnap, 1991).
Root non-Implicative in picture
Semantics: as above.
Pragmatics:
at t ′, ¬p in w0
at t ′, p in w1
w
t ′′
w1
|
w0, tu
at tu, ♦q knows ¬q(tu)
Know at tu: ¬q(tu); infer ¬p(t ′) is true in w0.
Hence conveys that p(t ′) is true in w ′, branching from w0.
Counterfactual interpretation: knows that ¬p but knows that the
actual world could have evolved in a way such that p.
Root non-Implicative
(15) Il a pu s’e´chapper a` ce moment la`, mais il ne s’est pas
e´chappe´
He could escape at that moment, but he did not escape
• Know ¬q(tu); Infer ¬p(t ′).
• Asserts: ♦p(t ′) (is the speaker being informative ?): p(t ′) true in
a metaphysical alternative at t ′.
↪→ Counterfactuality.
↪→ ‘Occasion’: at the time of the branching, the actual world could
have evolved in such a way that he escaped.
Chess player 1
Scenario: John could have won at move 39, but he misses the
chance.
(16) Il a pu / aurait pu gagner a` ce moment la`, #mais il a
perdu sa chance
He could have won at that precise moment, #but he
missed his chance
Same analysis for both (knowledge that ¬p at tu, and opening up
of the alternatives at the past time t ′) !
Strong set of constraint: present knowledge + constraint on
identity of worlds up to t ′ (a` la Condoravdi, 2002).
Chess player 2
Scenario: John never played the game which is under discussion.
(17) Il #a pu / aurait pu gagner, s’il avait joue´
He could have won, if he played
No constraint on identity (a` la Abush, 2012).
Preference for the past conditional
• In general: the preferred form is the one that conveys specific
information. We would have expected complementary distribution.
• However, for now (possible evolution ? See Spanish), the
conditions on the use of present perfect pouvoir seem too
constraining and require very precise knowledge.
• In particular, present perfect pouvoir cannot be used when the
adverb denoting a bounded period of time are absent, providing
the branching time.
↪→ Preference for the conditional as it requires only taking into
account a certain body of evidence and poses no constraints on
branching points.
In discourse
(18) What did John do ?
(#) Il a pu de´placer la table
He could move the table
The theory: the speaker conveys that (i) John moved the table
and (ii) it was not taken for granted.
Without previous expectation/doubt of the hearer, the speaker is
being too informative.
• If previous expectation is presupposed (What did John do,
finally? ), then the sentence is felicitous.
Conclusion
Maim features of the semantic-pragmatic theory:
I Operators in situ.
I Result state of the present perfect.
I Inferential use of the present perfect.
I Knowledge of/compatible with the result state.
Main results:
I Explain in a unified way the three available interpretations of
a pu-sentences.
I Explain why there is a competition between the
non-implicative reading and the counterfactual.
I Explain in a principled way how indirect evidence at the
utterance time and metaphysical alternatives relate to each
other.
I Explain the behavior of implicative a pu sentences in
discourse.
Thank you !
References
- Abush, D. (2012) Circumstantial and Temporal Dependence in
Counterfactual Modals. Natural Language Semantics 20.3, 273-297.
- Apothe´loz, D. and Nowakowska, M. (2010) La re´sultativite´ et la valeur
de parfait en franc¸ais et en polonais. Cahiers Chronos 21 : 1-23.
- Bhatt, R. (1999). Covert Modality in Non-Finite Contexts. PhD thesis,
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania.
- Boogaar, R. (2007). ’The Past and the Perfect of Epistemic Modals’.
in L. de Saussure, J. Moeschler and G. Puskas (eds.) Recent advances in
the syntax and semantics of tense, mood and aspect (Trends in
Linguistics Vol. 185). Berlin : Mouton De Gruyter, pp. 47-70.
- Condoravdi, C. (1992). Individual-level Predicates in Conditional
Clauses, paper presented at the LSA meeting, Philadelphia, PA.
- Condoravdi, C. (2002). Temporal interpretation of modals : Modals for
the present and for the past. In Beaver, D.,Kaufmann, S., Clark, B., et
Casillas, L. (eds), The Construction of Meaning. Stanford, CA : CSLI,
pp. 59-88.
- Demirdache, H. et Uribe-Etxebarria, M. (2008). Scope and anaphora
with time arguments: The case of ’perfect modals’. Lingua 118 :
1790-1815.
- Hacquard, V. (2006). Aspects of Modality. PhD thesis, Cambridge,
MA: MIT.
- Hacquard, V. (2009). On the interaction of aspect and modal
auxiliaries. Linguistics and Philosophy 32 : 279-315.
- Homer, V. (2010a). Actuality Entailments in French: A Case of
Aspectual Coercion Proceedings of WCCFL 28.
- Homer, V. (2010b) Epistemic Modals: High ma non troppo
Proceedings of NELS 40.
- Mari, A. (2010). Temporal reasoning and Modality. Invited talk at
‘Temporality: Typology and acquisition’, Paris VIII, March 2010.
- Mari, A. (2011). Modalite´s et temps. Des mode`les aux donne´es. HDR,
Paris-Sorbonne. To appear as a book at Bern: Peter Lang.
- Mari, A. (2013). Each other, asymmetry and reasonable futures.
Journal of Semantics doi:10.1093/jos/fft003 also available at
semantics archives.
- Mari, A. et Martin, F. (2007). Tense, abilities and actuality entailment.
In Aloni, M., Dekker, P., et Roelofsen, F., (eds.), Proceedings of the XVI
Amsterdam Colloquium, pp.151-156.
- Mari, A. et Schweitzer, S. (2010). ”Calculating the epistemic
interpretation of past modals via K.” Online Proceedings of the 29th
West Coast Conference on Formal Linguistics.
https://sites.google.com/site/wccfl28pro/mari-schweitzer
- Pin˜o´n, C. (2011). The pragmatics of actuality entailment. Talk
presented at Aspect and Modality in Lexical Semantics, Stuttgart, 30
Sept. 2011.
- de Swart, H. (2007). Cross-linguistic discourse analysis of the perfect.
Journal of Pragmatics 39(12), 2273-2307.
- Schaden, G. (2009). Present perfect compete. Linguistics and
Philosophy 32(2) : 115-141.
- Thomason, Richmond (1984). Combinations of tense and modality, in
D. M. Gabbay et F. Guenthner (eds.), Handbook of Philosophical Logic:
Extensions of Classical Logic, vol. II, pp. 136-165. Dordrecht: Reidel.
